Donald Trump will inevitably claim the rescue of the second crew member of a downed F-15 fighter as a propaganda triumph, but the 48-hour drama is a reminder that Iran is still able to fight back and inflict costs on the US. The episode also ought to be a caution for the White House as it contemplates whether to launch a ground operation in Iran to seize an island in the Persian Gulf and extract highly enriched uranium.
The US-Israeli bombing of Iran has been so heavily skewed in the attackers’ favour that a single shoot-down, five weeks into the war, immediately became a significant problem for the Americans because it is so rare. The last time a US warplane was shot down by hostile forces was in 2003, during the Iraq war. Though it is not exactly clear how the F-15E was brought down, the fact that it was is a reminder that the air superiority achieved by the US and Israeli air forces is not entirely absolute.
The decision to use an abandoned Iranian airstrip south of Isfahan as a forward operating location went wrong when two C-130 Hercules transporters, probably modified search and rescue variants, got stuck in the ground. They were destroyed by the US to prevent them falling into Iranian hands, and more transporters had to be brought forward to complete the extraction of the wounded second crew member. An HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopter involved in the rescue was also damaged by gunfire on Friday. The cost in lost and damaged airframes exceeds $250 million, largely for the rescue of the second crew member.
Although a single episode like this does not matter much to the US in military terms, losing aircraft is part of war. However, the enforced loss of the rescue C-130 transports is a reminder of the greater risks inherent in any US ground operation in Iran. Could it really be feasible for US special forces to seize the 440kg of highly enriched uranium thought to be hidden underground in canisters at Isfahan and fly them away without major incident? Iran – bombed in excess of 15,000 times so far – can still turn relatively small US or Israeli losses into a propaganda victory, precisely because they have been infrequent. In an asymmetric conflict, the weaker side only has to get lucky once.
