As nationwide protests against economic hardship swept Iran, the authoritarian regime in Tehran moved to impose a near-total internet blackout, a tactic designed to hide the scale of its ruthless response from the world. In response, many demonstrators turned to Elon Musk's Starlink satellite service, hoping it could pierce the digital curtain. However, experts reveal that even this technology is now being targeted by Iranian authorities through sophisticated GPS jamming attacks.
The Blackout and the Starlink Workaround
The Iranian regime initiated the widespread internet shutdown on Thursday, 14 January 2026, as part of a severe crackdown on protesters. Human rights groups report that at least 646 protesters have been killed. With conventional connectivity severed, the estimated 50,000 to over 100,000 Starlink terminals in the country, which have been in use since 2022, became a critical lifeline for communication.
"They started attacking Starlink," said Mahsa Alimardani, a specialist in digital repression and associate director at Witness. "We believe the way that they have been trying to disable Starlink from very early on, on Thursday evening, was through GPS jamming. By doing GPS jamming, it impacts the way the satellite receivers work."
Limitations and Potential Long-Term Solutions
Despite the jamming efforts, Ms Alimardani notes they have not been entirely effective. Most footage and information reaching the outside world since the blackout began is likely sourced from the remaining functional Starlink devices. However, she emphasises that Starlink is not a magic fix for 90 million people under a blackout, due to the limited number of ground terminals.
A more scalable, though costly, solution could be direct-to-cell satellite technology, where satellites act as cell towers in space. Companies like SpaceX could theoretically provide this, but would need to either work with local carriers or purchase the radio spectrum covering Iran. "This direct-to-cell solution in the short term could possibly help Iranians, but it obviously couldn't scale to 90 million," Alimardani explained, noting it is a long-term project requiring significant investment.
A History of Digital Repression
The current blackout follows a established pattern of Iranian internet control, a policy meticulously cultivated since the 2009 election protests. The state achieved dominance over telecoms infrastructure in the 2000s, with the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) acquiring a 51% stake in the national telecommunications company. All internet service providers operate under state licence, allowing for swift, centralised shutdowns.
"The biggest one we saw was in 2019. They shut down the internet for a week nationwide while they went ahead brutally repressing the protests," Alimardani stated. "This is ultimately what they use the shutdowns for: so they can do this brutal repression and stop the mobilisation of protests." She believes the 2026 shutdown stems from a sense of desperation and is viewed by the regime as a last resort to maintain control.
While foreign minister Abbas Araghchi promised the internet would be restored in cooperation with security forces, he provided no clear timeline. For the regime, losing the ability to enact such blackouts would mean surrendering a critical tool for quelling unrest, making the establishment of resilient systems like direct-to-cell a key battleground for Iran's future.
