England's World Cup ended with a familiar feeling of disappointment, and a narrative is building around Thomas Tuchel that it is never his fault when things go wrong. Having led Argentina until the closing minutes of the semi-final, Tuchel's side lost control of the match entirely before conceding twice late on to crash out.
England completed just 311 passes to Argentina's 588, with only three of them coming between the hydration break and Enzo Fernandez's equaliser. They failed to complete a single link-up play and touched the ball inside the opposition penalty area only four times to Argentina's 17. After the match, Tuchel offered his explanation of 'passive players' and added: 'Ball possession plays a crucial role. It's maybe not in our DNA like it is in our Spanish DNA or in our Argentinian-Brazilian DNA.'
Tuchel's Trend Bucked
If England's struggles were simply down to coaching, Tuchel's previous teams would show similar patterns. In fact, England's failure to control games on the ball flew in the face of everything his sides had stood for in most of his previous managerial stints. Across his final full seasons at Borussia Dortmund, Paris Saint-Germain and Bayern Munich, his sides consistently ranked among Europe's best for building attacks through combinations rather than simply dominating possession. They averaged between 12.7 and 17.2 link-up plays per 90 minutes, produced between 1.91 and 2.75 expected goals per game, and regularly generated more than 30 touches inside the opposition box.
Chelsea is the interesting exception because it was his only job in English club football. In the Premier League, his 2021/22 side still averaged over 609 passes per match – more than Dortmund or PSG and only slightly behind Bayern – so controlling possession was never the issue. What changed was what those passes produced. Through balls fell to roughly half Dortmund's rate, while link-up plays dropped to less than half of his Bayern average. The ball still moved, but Chelsea's possession simply produced dangerous attacks far less often.
England Didn't Just Struggle Against Argentina
The semi-final wasn't an isolated performance. Across the tournament, England averaged 475 passes per game, while Argentina averaged 661. Even allowing for England playing more than an hour with 10 men against Mexico, Tuchel's side never came close to matching Argentina's level of control. The difference became clearer once possession reached dangerous areas: England completed just 0.7 through balls per match compared with Argentina's 2.1. Link-up plays averaged only 1.7 per game against Argentina's 5.0, while passes into the final third were completed at a lower success rate (77% compared with 82%).
England weren't just seeing less of the ball; they were also progressing it less effectively than their semi-final opponents whenever they had it. Across the tournament, England actually won a higher proportion of both total duels (40.7% to 36.9%) and aerial duels (55.6% to 50%). This shows that the difference wasn't mainly to do with physicality, though England underperformed against Argentina in this respect too. Instead, it was primarily down to what happened after England recovered possession.
The Midfield Pipeline Matters
So, if it isn't the coaching, the explanation could lie deeper in England's player development. Machine Football's database identifies just 11 natural No. 6s from England currently playing across Europe's top five leagues: Elliot Anderson, Kobbie Mainoo, Alex Scott, James Garner, Curtis Jones, Tyler Morton, Tim Iroegbunam, Jordan Henderson, Ryan Yates, Ross Barkley and Lewis Cook. Spain – the country Tuchel explicitly pointed to as the benchmark for controlling games – have 21. That matters because the No. 6 is often the player responsible for turning possession into sustained control, progressing attacks rather than simply recycling the ball.
England's own squad reflected that shortage. Manchester United's Mainoo, second only to Rodri for passing accuracy in the opposition half among Premier League midfielders last season, did not play a single minute at this World Cup. Behind first-choice pairing Elliot Anderson and Declan Rice, Tuchel instead turned to Jordan Henderson and, in the knockouts, Reece James. The reliance on Rice became obvious in the semi-final. Rice profiles as a No. 8 within the Machine Football database, reflecting his more box-to-box role since joining Arsenal, but he does offer control and is therefore indispensable to England's system. Both of Argentina's goals arrived after he was withdrawn in the 82nd minute, with no like-for-like replacement trusted to see out the Three Lions' biggest game of the tournament.
Spain offers a useful contrast. As Pep Guardiola predicted when Rodri first returned from a season out with an ACL injury, Rodri has found his peak again at this World Cup. His passing maps are off the scale in this tournament. The Manchester City midfield general is just as important to Luis de la Fuente's side, yet when he went off at half-time in the Euro 2024 final, Martin Zubimendi stepped in and Spain went on to lift the trophy. England simply don't have the same depth in that position.
The Verdict
Tuchel pointed to several factors after the semi-final: fatigue, travel, the switch to a back five and England's lack of control in possession. The data suggests the last of those deserves the closest attention. Tuchel's own managerial career shows he can coach possession football, but England's tournament numbers show they still struggle to progress possession against elite opposition. The player pool also contains far fewer specialist control midfielders than elite teams like Spain. In that sense, Tuchel's 'DNA' argument holds up.
Adam Wharton, one of the most notable omissions from Tuchel's squad, was held up by many as an example of a player who could bring that technical excellence to the centre of the pitch that England so often seem to lack. But Wharton, despite his near peerless vision from deep (which earns him a 95.36 creativity score in the Machine Football database against other players in his position in the Premier League), only scores 42.19 for passing accuracy, having completed 79.3% of his passes in the league last season. For all his brilliance, Wharton does not offer the control England desperately need. England don't just play differently; they consistently produce fewer players whose primary strength is controlling games with the ball.
Many of the other high-profile players Tuchel left out – Trent Alexander-Arnold, Cole Palmer, Phil Foden – are also risk-taking creative types. Perhaps England could have done with more of these kinds of players at the tournament, but none of them would have solved the possession issue. That looks less like a coaching issue and more like a structure and personnel one, and it could explain why the same questions have followed two very different England managers. Of course, this isn't to absolve Tuchel of the blame for one of the most catastrophic tactical blunders ever seen in a major semi-final – but it might offer some context as to why he has been unable to bring England's identity closer to the teams that have earned the German his reputation. Whether he gets the time to change that remains to be seen.
