Mourners at a funeral for victims of a bomb attack on Sunday in Cajibio. Photograph: Jair Coll/Reuters
As the country prepares to elect a new president, a fierce debate is raging on how to end the decades-long armed conflict for good. The landmark 2016 peace deal between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) succeeded in some ways: the Farc agreed to lay down their weapons, reducing violence substantially. However, the deal alone could not end the conflict. Subsequent administrations slow-walked implementation, and the settlement was rejected by Farc dissidents and other rebel factions.
When Gustavo Petro, a former rebel, became president in 2022, he pledged 'total peace', signing deals with all armed groups, including leftwing rebels and organised crime. Four years later, weeks before the election, guerrilla attacks are surging, and Colombians experience a bitter sense of deja vu. Amid rising homicides, kidnappings, and massacres, the internal armed conflict that claimed nearly half a million lives is central to the vote.
Twenty-one people were killed in a bombing on a major road at the weekend, one of the deadliest attacks on civilians. The attack was carried out by the Farc dissident group Central Command (ECM). 'It was not an isolated incident,' said Maria Victoria Llorente, executive director of Ideas for Peace Foundation. 'It has to be seen in the broader context of organised violence in Colombia.'
Petro's peace promise is a key issue before the election's first round on 31 May. The constitution prevents re-election, and Petro's chosen candidate, leftwing senator Ivan Cepeda, supports 'total peace'. Rightwing candidates Abelardo de la Espriella and Paloma Valencia promise to scrap the plan and return to all-out war. Llorente said: 'It is clear that total peace has failed. When this government began, there were six departments under dispute. Today there are between 13 and 14.'
The plan offered armed groups reduced sentences, wealth retention, and suspension of military operations in exchange for dismantling and disarmament. Petro announced a ceasefire with five largest groups without protocols or monitoring, which had been vital to the original peace deal. The National Liberation Army (ELN) denied agreeing to a truce. Further attempts failed, and most negotiations are frozen or abandoned.
Armed factions have taken advantage of ceasefires to expand, clashing for territorial control and illicit economies like drug trafficking and mining. In early 2025, fighting between ELN and Farc dissident group Frente 33 left over 80 dead and 60,000 displaced, the largest forced displacement in Colombia's history. Petro authorised resumption of airstrikes, some killing young people forcibly recruited by criminal groups.
This year is the most violent since 2016, and the election saw the first assassination of a presidential hopeful in over three decades. Rightwing senator Miguel Uribe Turbay was shot in June 2025 by Farc dissident group Segunda Marquetalia and died months later. In February, leftwing senator Aida Quilcue was briefly kidnapped in Cauca, where the bomb exploded. She said the ambush marked a new level of danger. Quilcue was later announced as Cepeda's vice-presidential candidate.
Francisco Daza of the Colombian Peace and Reconciliation Foundation said: 'The elections have been marred by a context of insecurity and violence.' All main candidates reported threats. Daza said illegal armed groups seek to interfere, limiting electoral participation. Many citizens avoid political rallies, and large rural areas are no-go zones for politicians without armed group permission.
Llorente said some perceive the country has returned to its worst violence, but the scale is different. Current homicide rates are about 26 per 100,000, far below the peak of 80 in the early 1990s. She said: 'The key lesson is that all tools—negotiation, public force, criminal policy—must be used strategically.' Catalina Beltran of Colombia Risk Analysis said the next government faces an extremely difficult challenge due to conflict fragmentation. 'Rather than a single solution, a mixed strategy of negotiations and offensive actions could be most appropriate.'
