Iranian Covert Agents Infiltrate Australia to Sow Discord on Behalf of Hostile Regime
Australians have been issued a stark warning that covert agents from Iran have successfully infiltrated the country and are actively working to sow discontent and division on behalf of the hostile Tehran regime. The alarming revelation was made public on Tuesday by Kambiz 'Kam' Razmara, a lawyer and vice president of the apolitical and non-religious Australian Iranian Society of Victoria.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Behind the Operations
Razmara told the Daily Mail that the root of these concerning activities stems directly from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which Australia officially categorised as a state sponsor of terrorism in November. This designation followed the expulsion of Iran's ambassador over serious allegations that he directed attacks against Jewish targets in Sydney and Melbourne.
'The IRGC employs proxy networks and indirect methods to conduct operations beyond Iran’s borders,' Mr Razmara explained. 'These include repression, intimidation, and influence campaigns targeting diaspora communities, including Australian-Iranians.'
The specific incidents that prompted Australia's strong response included the firebombing of the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne on December 6, 2024, and an arson attack on Lewis' Continental Kitchen in Sydney two months prior. These marked historic moments as the first time since World War II that Canberra had expelled an ambassador.
Government Response and Security Concerns
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described these events in August as 'extraordinary and dangerous acts of aggression orchestrated by a foreign nation on Australian soil.' The actions have been attributed to individuals working on behalf of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Razmara highlighted a significant gap in Australia's response, noting that while the criminal code targets intentional assistance to groups like the IRGC, there is a critical lack of public information to properly inform citizens. 'The absence of public enforcement or prosecution data and practical guidance leaves Australians – including Australian-Iranians – uncertain about how to identify an IRGC agent,' he stated.
This uncertainty is particularly problematic when regime-aligned actors employ coordinated tactics including trolling, physical and online intimidation, and bullying designed specifically to disrupt social cohesion and unity within communities.
Expert Analysis on Foreign Interference Tactics
Security experts have confirmed that Australia is facing sophisticated foreign interference operations. Sirius Geopolitics founder Alana Ford noted: 'Intimidation tactics, surveillance and counterintelligence operations, and influence campaigns are all real threats for quite a few different diasporas in Australia.'
Elisabeth Braw, a security expert and Atlantic Council senior fellow, explained that both Russia and Iran specialise in these methods. 'It is a well-known tactic. It's part of grey zone aggression, which is aggression against other countries using non-military means,' she told the Daily Mail.
Braw elaborated on how these operations work: 'What you can do with Western countries is essentially foment discord by spreading lies. That's something that Russia has done a lot online and, apparently, Iran may be doing the same in Australia.' She added that European nations have witnessed Iranian actors amplifying disinformation and misinformation on social media platforms to deliberately agitate people against authorities.
Calls for Government Action and Transparency
The Australian Iranian Society of Victoria has urgently called on the Albanese government to increase transparency within the boundaries of intelligence services. 'We urge the Commonwealth to publish de‑identified enforcement data and illustrative case studies,' Mr Razmara emphasised.
He further argued that communities require clear, plain English guidance on identifying indicators of foreign agency activities, along with targeted funding for digital-safety education and establishing safe reporting pathways for concerned citizens.
Elisabeth Braw strongly supported this position, highlighting the crucial importance of information literacy in defending against foreign interference. 'Most people don't have information literacy. They just use the internet without any training, which is crazy,' she observed.
Braw proposed practical solutions: 'Most countries don't provide information literacy training so governments should run information literacy campaigns. It doesn't even have to be a course you have to attend, but [maybe] public awareness campaigns.' She warned that 'foreign countries will keep [stirring up] discord online as long as people are gullible and don't check where information comes from.'
Official Government Position and Resources
A Department of Home Affairs spokesman confirmed that Australia faces persistent threats, stating: 'Australia was a target of sophisticated and persistent foreign interference activities from a range of countries.'
The spokesman acknowledged the particular vulnerability of diaspora communities: 'While the threat applies to the Australian community generally, members of Australia’s diaspora communities are often at greater risk of interference from foreign powers seeking to exert a measure of authority and control over them.'
The federal government has developed an online Foreign Interference Community Support Hub, which provides essential information about what constitutes foreign interference and offers practical advice on cyber security and detecting misinformation. The Department spokesman assured that 'Australia’s law enforcement agencies will assess, investigate, disrupt and, where possible, prosecute acts of foreign interference.'
