A major investigation into the 1989 Hillsborough disaster has concluded that twelve police officers would have faced gross misconduct proceedings for their 'fundamental failures' and 'concerted efforts' to shift blame onto Liverpool supporters in the tragedy's aftermath.
Systemic Failures and a Campaign of Deception
The Independent Office for Police Conduct's (IOPC) long-awaited report upheld or found cases to answer for misconduct in a total of 92 complaints about officers' actions. However, due to the law at the time, no officer will face disciplinary action as they had all retired before the investigations commenced.
The IOPC has identified the origins of the false narratives that smeared Liverpool fans, which culminated in The Sun newspaper's infamous 'The Truth' front page. The report states that two South Yorkshire Police (SYP) officers, Chief Inspector David Sumner and PC Paul Middup, alongside Sheffield Hallam Conservative MP Sir Irvine Patrick, began spreading the misleading line. Patrick, who was knighted five years after the disaster, disseminated gossip he heard in a local police social club.
The first publication to run with this story was the local Sheffield Star, not a news agency copy. National papers, however, picked up the story from the White's news agency copy. The IOPC notes that The Sun's coverage was uniquely damaging as it presented allegations as established facts.
Critical Safety Oversights and Fatal Decisions
The report details a series of catastrophic planning errors. Expert analysis established that the safe capacity for the West Terrace at the Leppings Lane end was 3,089, yet 7,200 tickets were sold for that area. Furthermore, a change in turnstile allocation meant all 10,100 Liverpool fans with standing tickets had to funnel through just seven turnstiles.
Shockingly, the IOPC found that SYP had proposed a redesign of the Leppings Lane entrance in 1985 to ease crowd management, but Sheffield Wednesday Football Club rejected the plans on cost grounds, prioritising fire safety after the Bradford City disaster instead. An expert concluded this redesign could have averted the tragedy or lessened its severity.
The investigation also revisited the fateful opening of Gate C. Contrary to long-held belief, the initial opening may not have been on the command of match commander Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield, but a casual decision by stewards. While a brief opening at 2:48pm eased pressure, its perceived success may have led a steward to open it again at 2:52pm. This time, it remained open for minutes, allowing over 2,000 fans to enter with catastrophic consequences. Duckenfield's order to open the gate came at the same time, but evidence suggests no officers acted on it.
Aftermath: Inadequate Response and Victim Smears
The report highlights the inadequacy of the emergency response for families. A 'Casualty Bureau' set up to inform relatives was overwhelmed, with insufficient phone lines. It was later revealed SYP had only ever established one before, for a much smaller incident.
In a deeply disturbing finding, the IOPC reports that West Midlands Police, which investigated the disaster, conducted Criminal Records Office checks on 94 of the deceased. No specific explanation for this has been found, and no one has admitted authorising it, echoing earlier findings of attempts to 'impugn personal reputations.'
The IOPC also debunked several enduring myths. It found no truth to claims that Liverpool fans burned a police horse with cigarettes, and it found no evidence that SYP's blame-shifting was related to Freemasonry. Additionally, it noted a 14% overall reduction in police numbers for the 1989 semi-final compared to the previous year, with a 21.6% reduction in the area where Liverpool fans arrived.
Finally, the report reveals that Duckenfield's preparation for his first major match as commander was hampered by professional jealousy from his predecessor, who provided a poor handover, leaving Duckenfield insufficiently familiar with the Hillsborough stadium layout.
