The Accidental Prime Minister
On the 5th of July 2024, Sir Keir Starmer stood outside Downing Street celebrating a general election victory that, according to a compelling analysis, was never part of the original plan. The photograph of his triumph, captured by David Levene for The Guardian, belied a deeper truth about his leadership. Contrary to public perception, Starmer's ascent to Prime Minister was an accidental outcome, a result of circumstances his own backers never anticipated.
A Shotgun Marriage and a Doomed Project
The strategy, allegedly hatched by a small clique of right-wing faction fighters within the Labour Party, was fundamentally different. Their intended candidate for the premiership was always Wes Streeting. Starmer's role was perceived as a temporary one: to present a professionalised version of Corbynism to win the party leadership, then act as a placeholder. The plan was for him to lead Labour to a respectable defeat against the formidable Tory majority of 2019, paving the way for Streeting to secure a subsequent election.
This alliance between Starmer and the party's anti-Corbyn faction was, from the beginning, a shotgun marriage that lacked genuine vision or ideological cohesion. The Blairites, including figures like Rachel Reeves, reportedly held a deep-seated disdain for Starmer due to his previous alignment with Jeremy Corbyn during the protracted Brexit negotiations. However, they needed him precisely because his association with the Corbyn project made him the only figure who could effectively break its grip on the party.
What nobody foresaw was the perfect storm of the Covid-19 pandemic, profound Tory turmoil, and the collapse of the SNP. These factors transformed the political landscape, handing Starmer a victory that was never in the script. Just as Jeremy Corbyn became Labour's accidental leader in 2015, Keir Starmer became its accidental Prime Minister in 2024.
Governing Without a Compass
The fundamental flaw in the project, beyond its fractured origins, was a critical lack of intellectual groundwork. There was no compelling vision for why they wanted to win or how they would govern. This void was filled with arrogance and a hyper-factionalism that, once in power, secured total control of the party but left the government with no breadth, no depth, and no capacity for constructive challenge.
This coercive discipline was deployed during the general election campaign, leading to what are now described as "cast-iron pledges" on tax that are returning to haunt the administration. The analysis argues that Starmer did not win the election on the strength of his platform, but by default, due to the meltdown of the Conservative Party and the split in the right-wing vote with Reform UK.
Consequently, despite commanding a massive 169-seat majority, the Labour government is finding it impossible to govern effectively. The absence of a unifying vision and an inability to deliver has created a power vacuum. The author contends that successful modern governments cannot rely on parliamentary majorities alone; they require support, participation, and advocacy throughout the country. A better future must be negotiated, not imposed from the top down.
Now, the vultures are circling around a weakened Starmer. His refusal to define a political philosophy—a self-proclaimed denial of 'Starmerism'—means he has few ideological defenders. There is nothing substantive to rally behind, leaving his leadership exposed.
An Existential Crisis and a Potential Way Out
The crisis facing Labour is not a temporary blip but is structural and fundamental. There is a palpable fear that the party could follow the fate of its counterparts in France, sliding from government to political marginality almost overnight. The question now being whispered in Westminster corridors is whether the "true" path of history will reassert itself, leading to Wes Streeting eventually taking the crown as was originally intended.
For Labour to recover, the solution is not merely a change of leader. It requires a complete overhaul of the party's policy and cultural direction. The article poses critical questions that MPs must confront:
- What economic policy will deliver shared growth?
- How can the state be rewired to devolve power and resources?
- How can hyper-factionalism be ended and a culture of pluralism instilled?
Any new leader who was complicit in creating the current mess is unlikely to be able to resolve it. The article suggests that figures like Ed Miliband, Angela Rayner, and Andy Burnham possess a combination of skills and talents that could begin to navigate the party out of this existential crisis. However, it will require immense bravery to address not just the threat of Reform UK, but the underlying causes of its rise. If this is not to be Labour's endgame, nothing less than a fundamental transformation will suffice.
