Four Years After Putin's Invasion: Europe's Intelligence Failures in Ukraine
Tuesday marked the fourth anniversary of Vladimir Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a moment that irrevocably altered the fate of Ukraine and the history of Europe. On 24 February 2022, the world watched as the Kremlin's decision unleashed a war that continues to shape global politics today.
The Night Before the Storm
Around 9pm on 23 February 2022, a colleague at another news outlet sent an unequivocal warning from an intelligence source: the war would start that night. The Guardian's Ukraine reporting team and international editors discussed this alarming message. Emma Graham-Harrison, who was on an overnight train from Kyiv towards Mariupol, decided to disembark halfway and catch the first train back to Kyiv. This proved a wise move, as Mariupol soon fell under siege, becoming a scene of some of the war's worst carnage. Emma remained in Kyiv, covering the initial Russian attack on the capital.
Adapting to a Grim Reality
Four years later, millions of Ukrainians have been forced to adapt to the grim reality of living in a war zone. They have endured the withdrawal of Russian forces from Kyiv and the atrocities left behind, the euphoria of liberating Kherson and other cities, which soon settled into the grinding attritional war seen today. On this anniversary, many fear that Donald Trump's negotiations will lead nowhere, and the conflict could drag on for months or years.
In the early days, war was a terrifying and unpredictable new world. Memories of the maelstrom at Kyiv's train station, as thousands tried to flee amid fears of Russian arrival, remain vivid. I recall sheltering in the apartment of a Kyiv taxi driver south of Kyiv on the second night of the war, along with his wife and three kids. When I returned a few days later, the place was silent and empty: his family had fled to Poland, one of millions of Ukrainian families split by the conflict.
Odd Images and Prewar Scepticism
Odder images stick with me, too, like the fancy supermarket we visited for supplies on the third day of the war, filled with mangos and dragon fruits sitting absurdly in the new context, mementoes of a world torn apart by Putin's attack. In the weeks before the invasion, I was among those sceptical of an assault on Kyiv, believing Russian military action in eastern Ukraine was more likely. I assumed Putin's intelligence services would conclude that holding Ukraine or imposing a pro-Russian leader was unworkable.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy shared this view: even as London and Washington warned of war, most Ukrainian sources dismissed it as nonsense. But once the invasion started, that prewar period faded. Zelenskyy became a heroic wartime leader, and Europe, initially, united against the Russian threat. Ukrainian resistance repelled Russians from Kyiv's outskirts, a huge victory that the country still exists, though peace prospects remain bleak.
Behind-the-Scenes Intelligence Games
As the war progressed, I wanted to revisit those prewar moments to understand what happened behind the scenes. Why were the US and UK so sure of the invasion, while others dismissed it? Why did Zelenskyy adamantly dismiss American warnings? Why did France and Germany ignore alerts, leaving the head of Germany's intelligence service stranded in Kyiv on invasion morning? How did we know enough to pull Emma off the night train, while Ukraine's defence minister went to bed unprepared?
Around a year ago, I started interviewing officials in high positions from Ukraine, Europe, and the US, uncovering an untold story of behind-the-scenes intelligence games. This involved over 100 interviews across multiple countries, including senior intelligence officials and much of Ukraine's security elite from 2022. The resulting article is deeply researched, offering insights into public interest journalism supported by reader funding for editorial independence.
Two Totally Different Starting Points
So why did France, Germany, and other European governments doubt US warnings? Several reasons emerged, including the legacy of faulty US and UK intelligence over Iraq in 2003. One European foreign minister recalled telling US secretary of state Antony Blinken, "I'm old enough to remember 2003, and back then I was one of those who believed you." Another reason was misreading Putin as a rational actor.
A British defence intelligence official noted, "I think they took as a starting point: 'Why would he?' And we took as a starting point: 'Why wouldn't he?' And that simple semantic difference can lead you to wildly different conclusions." This research offers lessons for the future, as our world grows more dangerous. Part of the reason Paris and Berlin didn't believe in full-scale war was that it seemed so unlikely. As concluded, the key intelligence lesson is stark: do not rule things out just because they once seemed impossible.
