A man with paralysis recently demonstrated playing chess using only his mind, thanks to a brain implant from Elon Musk's Neuralink. Noland Arbaugh, who has been paralysed for eight years, said it became intuitive to imagine the cursor moving. This raises philosophical questions about whether the implant is part of his mind or separate.
Philosopher Dvija Mehta argues that brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) like Neuralink challenge our concepts of self and responsibility. The extended mind hypothesis, proposed by David Chalmers and Andy Clarke in 1998, suggests technology can become part of our cognitive processes. They predicted a scenario where someone with a brain implant manipulates objects on a screen, much like Arbaugh's case.
Mehta distinguishes between 'happenings' (mental processes) and 'doings' (actions). For most people, intentions and actions are inseparable. But for Arbaugh, his intention is separate from the implant's execution, creating a 'contemplation conundrum' where actions may feel alien. This raises concerns about ownership and control over BCI-integrated actions.
Neuralink's long-term vision includes making implants available to the general population for enhancement, not just medical use. This could further blur the line between human and machine, forcing society to reconsider the boundaries of personhood.
