Only four months ago, Ella Adman had just finished school and had never before held a gun. Now, standing in the shade between drills at a military base on Gotland, the strategically important Swedish Baltic island where she grew up, the 19-year-old conscript carries a powerful assault rifle. In days, she is due to guard the royal family in Stockholm on her first official mission.
Adman is one of hundreds of conscripts sent to the base near the medieval walled city of Visby as part of a rapid remilitarisation process on Gotland, amid Sweden's wider rearmament. At the height of the cold war, Gotland had four regiments and at full mobilisation a strength of 25,000 soldiers. But in 2005 the last regiment, P18, was closed, leaving only a reduced Home Guard battalion.
Strategic importance of Gotland
Positioned 275km from Kaliningrad – the militarised Russian exclave between Lithuania and Poland – and 87km from the Swedish mainland, Gotland is seen as ideally positioned for President Vladimir Putin to gain a foothold in the Baltic, sometimes called the “Nato sea”. As Sweden’s largest island, home to 60,858 people and host to the Almedalen democracy festival, an attack would have huge symbolic significance.
In Swedish defence plans for 2025-30, a surprise attack on Gotland – by air or sea to set up air and naval defence zones – was named as one of seven potential situations requiring prioritised planning. According to Swedish defence chiefs, from Gotland it is possible to control sea and air operations in the Baltic region and control the entrance of reinforcements to Baltic states.
Rapid remilitarisation and Nato integration
“If you are able to control Gotland, you are able to control the Baltic Sea as well,” said Col Andreas Gustafsson, commanding officer for the Swedish army in Gotland. “So we need to keep control of Gotland – for Sweden, but also for Nato’s sake.” Since being re-established in 2018 amid growing fears of Russian attack, P18 has been built up at unprecedented speed, accelerated by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since Sweden’s accession to Nato, the island regularly hosts Nato training exercises.
Sweden has upped its defence contributions to 2.8% of GDP for 2026 and 3.1% from 2028, and expanded conscription. But re-armament is proving difficult, said Gustafsson: “Nato is currently in a major growth phase, which means everyone is out looking for military hardware… it takes time to get hold of military equipment, particularly artillery systems, and acts as a limiting factor.”
Threat assessment and deterrence
There is no immediate threat of a “conventional attack” on Gotland, said Gustafsson, with espionage and sabotage more likely, but it cannot be ruled out. The island could be particularly vulnerable in the event of a ceasefire or peace deal with Ukraine, as Russian forces could be quickly redispersed towards Finland and the Baltic states. “The risk is always that Russia becomes desperate. The more pressure Russia is under, the more desperate they can be as well.”
If Russia were to attack, Sweden plans to defend itself and keep civilians largely in place. When mobilised, the combat group to protect Gotland numbers about 4,500. “Of course, we would defend Gotland and do all we can to stop Russia getting a foothold,” said Gustafsson. The hope is that remilitarisation will act as a sufficient deterrent.
Civilian resilience initiatives
Gotland is also acting as a test platform for defending Sweden in a civilian capacity. Eva Rinblad, a doctor, set up an emergency preparedness group in her neighbourhood after growing warnings from authorities. Following the Stark socken (strong parish) scheme, a Gotland-wide civil preparedness initiative, they carried out a collective neighbourhood inventory of supplies including water, electricity and communication. Next they plan to map all available water sources.
Rinblad plans to set up a local safety hub for updated information, heat, cooking, phone charging and overnight stays. At home she has a food cellar, extensive fruit and vegetable patches, chickens, ducks, solar panels and rain collection butts. If Russia attacked, she hopes local authorities would help the most vulnerable but that wider society should continue daily life where possible.
Total defence approach
Later this year, Gotland will test an emergency evacuation of several hundred people from one part of the island to another. Mikael Frisell, director general of the Swedish civil defence and resilience agency (MSB), said: “We have a very serious world situation and we notice out on the Baltic Sea that it is an area in which we are very close to Russia and there are incidents both above and below the surface.” To ensure “total defence” of Gotland, a military presence and a “strong and robust and resilient civilian defence” are needed. “If we have that it contributes to the whole of Nato’s collective defence in this region.”
In case of attack, Gotland risks becoming “isolated” and having supply flows disrupted. “We are working to get Gotland to be as self-sufficient as possible as it is an island in the Baltic Sea.” MSB is using Gotland as a template for the rest of Sweden, and Sweden’s approach is catching attention of other countries, including the UK.
Local perspectives and challenges
Emil Edenborg, a Stockholm University professor studying Baltic islands, said although most people support the return of the military, changes have not been without friction, including discourse over building permits and implications for windfarm development. “Complaints are not so much about local armed forces but about Stockholm and bureaucrats, seen as neglecting the interests of islanders.”
Per Wikberg, preparedness strategist for Gotland, described the ferry harbour in Visby as the “highway” to Gotland. While the island is well on its way to self-sufficiency, much remains to be done. “You can never be finished. When shit hits the fan, what happens then? Is our planning good enough or do we need to make changes?”
