The delusion of achieving swift victory through aerial dominance has repeatedly seduced the United States into military engagements, with the current conflict against Iran being the latest example. This strategy, championed by figures like Donald Trump and his defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, traces its roots back over a century to the controversial theories of Italian General Giulio Douhet.
The Historical Foundations of Air Superiority
In 1921, Giulio Douhet published "The Command of the Air," advocating for a radical shift in warfare. He argued that future triumphs would not stem from grueling trench combat but from large-scale aerial bombardments targeting civilian infrastructure and logistics. Douhet believed that destroying railroads, bakeries, and supply lines was more effective than attacking military trenches, using grim metaphors like wiping out a species by destroying its eggs and nests.
Influence on Modern Military Strategy
Douhet's ideas inspired historical figures such as Hitler, who deployed airpower in attacks like Guernica and the Blitz, and American strategists like General Curtis LeMay, who oversaw firebombing campaigns in Japan and nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Today, these threads resurface in Pete Hegseth's bombastic briefings on Operation Epic Fury, the air war against Iran, despite his claims of innovation.
Hegseth promises "the most lethal and precise air power campaign in history," echoing Douhet's obsession with inflicting maximum damage quickly. He emphasizes quantity, stating, "Quantity has a quality all its own," and highlights the destruction of civilian morale, though he stops short of advocating direct strikes on civilians. However, critics argue this is merely a recycled approach, not a revolutionary one.
Patterns of Exaggeration and Failure
History reveals a consistent pattern where military leaders, from Desert Storm in 1991 to operations in Serbia and Iraq, have touted technological breakthroughs as game-changers. In Desert Storm, early enthusiasm over precision bombing, exemplified by the F-117A stealth aircraft, was later debunked by Government Accountability Office studies showing inflated success rates. Similarly, in Kosovo, NATO's bombing campaign damaged only a fraction of Serb tanks despite thousands of sorties.
The Illusion of Technological Omniscience
Winslow Wheeler, a former GAO official, notes that while technology advances, human nature remains unchanged. Bombing often strengthens resistance rather than breaking will, as seen in German attacks on Britain during World War II. In Vietnam, attempts to shut down the Ho Chi Minh trail with high-tech sensors were thwarted by low-tech solutions like animal urine, highlighting the limits of aerial dominance.
The "shock and awe" campaign under George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld in 2003 further illustrates this trend, with boasts of unprecedented force failing to topple Saddam Hussein without ground troops. Today, Hegseth adds artificial intelligence to the mix, claiming AI-enhanced autonomous systems are key to defeating Iran, but skepticism persists.
Conclusion: A Century-Old Delusion
From Douhet's early theories to Hegseth's modern rhetoric, the promise of easy victory through airpower has proven elusive. Despite advancements in precision and technology, wars are rarely won from the skies alone. The US's latest engagement in Iran may be another chapter in this enduring narrative, driven by the same alluring but flawed belief in aerial supremacy that has persisted for over 100 years.
