Friedrich Merz’s criticism of Donald Trump last month was not an isolated outburst but part of a broader shift among European leaders, who are increasingly willing to publicly confront the Trump administration on issues from Iran to Ukraine and European sovereignty. The German chancellor’s remarks, made at a school event in his constituency, questioned Trump’s exit strategy for the war on Iran and suggested Tehran’s diplomacy had “humiliated” the US. Merz followed a series of tough interventions from Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer and even Giorgia Meloni.
The US attempt to acquire Greenland earlier this year crossed European red lines on territorial integrity and self-determination, as did efforts by Trump and JD Vance to influence Hungary’s election. However, the key driver of Europe’s harder stance is the growing belief that Washington holds less leverage over the continent than a year ago. The Iran war has shown that the US needs Europe-based military infrastructure, and Europe’s military spending has risen sharply, with a growing share directed to European arms manufacturers.
While the US remains Europe’s dominant arms supplier, its share of arms transfers to Europe fell to 58% from 2021-25, down from 64% over 2020-24, according to the Sipri thinktank. On Ukraine, the US halted all financing in March 2025, leaving the EU as the main funder. Ukraine now sources 60% of military hardware domestically and 20% from European suppliers, reducing dependence on US capabilities. European officials believe even a significant reduction in US intelligence and air defence support would not cause an immediate Ukrainian collapse.
European governments have also noticed that many Trump threats fail to materialise, with resistance growing from Congress, courts and parts of his own coalition. The failure of Trump and Vance’s interventions in Hungary has reduced fears about the Maga movement’s influence on European elections. Standing up to the US is giving European leaders a poll bounce, given Trump’s unpopularity among the European public.
This shift will shape Europe’s response to future disputes, particularly on trade. If Washington proceeds with higher tariffs on European exports, the EU will respond more forcefully than last year, when it accepted a 15% tariff hike. EU member states have approved retaliatory measures covering €93bn of US exports, while the EU will continue “de-risking” from the US in defence, digital services and other areas. The Greenland risk could resurface; if Trump renews territorial threats, the EU would likely use its anti-coercion instrument to target US hi-tech service providers.
