In 2024, 21 out of 27 European Union countries experienced more deaths than births, according to Professor Sarah Harper, director of the Oxford Institute of Population Ageing. This trend, observed across much of the developed world, reflects two long-running demographic changes: increasing life expectancy and declining fertility rates.
The Tipping Point: When Deaths Exceed Births
Societies worldwide are grappling with the social and economic consequences of people living longer and having fewer children. In Japan, companies now specialise in cleaning the apartments of elderly individuals who have died alone and remained undiscovered for weeks. Adult incontinence pad sales have surpassed nappy sales for over a decade. In Italy, depopulating villages are selling homes for one euro to attract new residents and sustain local services. In the United Kingdom, falling pupil numbers are forcing school closures in parts of London.
These are not isolated incidents but indicators of a broader shift. Across Asia and the Americas, from Japan and South Korea to Cuba and Uruguay, many countries are witnessing the same pattern.
UK Projections: Deaths to Outnumber Births from 2026
In the UK, the latest Office for National Statistics (ONS) projections indicate that deaths will outnumber births annually from 2026 onwards, driven by declining fertility and the ageing post-war baby boom generation. The population is still expected to grow, but more slowly, peaking at around 72.5 million in 2054 before gradually declining. Earlier forecasts had suggested growth until 2096.
Dr Paul Morland, demographer and author of No One Left: Why the World Needs More Children, notes that while the crossover point is emotionally significant, it is part of a long process. Life expectancy has been rising since the late 18th century, while fertility has been declining since the late 19th century, aside from a mid-20th century rebound.
Reasons for Falling Fertility
The reasons for fewer children are complex. A fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman is typically needed for population replacement; the UK rate is 1.44. Professor Melanie Channon from the University of Bath highlights that recent declines have been especially marked among those under 30, indicating postponement, but even accounting for later parenthood, fertility continues to fall.
These changes are already impacting sectors serving children, including maternity care, schools, and childminders. Falling enrolment is forcing some schools to close, and businesses like soft play centres are struggling. Midwifery training is also affected, as students must attend a minimum number of births.
Dr Bernice Kuang from the University of Southampton warns that working parents, disproportionately mothers, may have to leave the workforce or reduce hours, with implications for the economy and gender equality.
Ageing Populations and Economic Consequences
Longer lifespans contribute to a gradual greying of the population. Morland argues that ageing societies tend to become more risk-averse, with investment flowing into safer assets rather than innovation. A smaller, older workforce may be less entrepreneurial, hindering economic growth.
Public finances face pressure as fewer workers support rising spending on pensions, health, and social care. Older people require higher levels of support, placing a growing burden on younger workers.
Consumption patterns also shift: younger people spend more on goods and appliances, while older people spend more on care and services that cannot easily be automated or offshored. As Morland puts it, just as the labour force dries up, demand for local hands-on labour increases.
Global Spread of Demographic Trends
These trends have spread beyond the richest economies. In many middle- and lower-income countries, fertility is falling despite limited economic development. Parts of Latin America, Jamaica, Thailand, and Indian states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala have fertility rates comparable to or lower than Britain. Morland notes that some countries will grow old before they grow rich.
Historically, falling birthrates followed rising incomes, urbanisation, and education. Now, fertility is declining more rapidly than economic development, driven by changing aspirations and social norms.
However, the pattern is not uniform. Israel maintains much higher birth rates (about three children per woman), suggesting cultural factors play a role. The UK may be more resilient due to a persistent two-child norm, says Channon, which keeps fertility slightly higher than in some European countries where single children are more accepted.
In sub-Saharan Africa, fertility remains high and populations grow rapidly, while in parts of central Asia, economies have grown without corresponding declines in births.
Role of Migration
Migration plays a crucial role. While deaths may outnumber births, the UK population is still expected to grow for now, largely due to net inward migration, though at lower levels than previously assumed. Demographic projections are not destiny; they do not account for shocks or policy shifts, and migration is particularly hard to predict.
As the ONS states: projections are not forecasts.
Adapting to Demographic Change
The question is not whether demographic change can be reversed, but how societies respond. Some changes are already baked in due to population momentum. Kuang points to China, where decades of low fertility have only recently translated into population decline. This means there is time to act.
Morland argues that countries with low fertility face trade-offs between economic growth, migration, and birthrates. Rather than trying to fix falling birthrates, policymakers should prepare for an older population by rethinking old age support, enabling longer working lives, and redesigning institutions.
Professor Harper emphasises that 20th-century labour markets, pension systems, family norms, healthcare, and long-term care were built under demographic conditions that no longer prevail. Adapting to longer lives requires rethinking work, retirement, and support. The traditional linear life course of education, continuous employment, and abrupt retirement is increasingly obsolete.
Longer lives may involve more flexible work patterns, retraining, phased retirement, tackling ageism, supporting lifelong learning, and redesigning homes, transport, and public spaces to foster independence and connection in later life.
Supporting Family Intentions
While telling people to have more babies is unlikely to work, policies can support those who want children. Channon notes that in three-quarters of surveyed countries, over 40% of women end their reproductive lives with fewer children than desired, due to economic insecurity, work-family conflict, and social constraints.
Policies like affordable childcare and parental leave can help people realise their intentions, though they are unlikely to dramatically raise birthrates. Comprehensive reproductive health education in schools is also needed, as curricula often omit fertility, preconception health, pregnancy, and miscarriage.
Migration can ease labour shortages in the short term, as migrants are typically young and economically active, but it is not a magic bullet. Migrants also age, so fixed migration levels cannot keep pace with reduced fertility and ageing. Kuang warns against encouraging migration solely to fill labour gaps without offering a viable long-term future.
Ethical questions arise regarding the impact on countries losing skilled workers to richer economies.
Gradual Change Requires Proactive Adaptation
Demographic change rarely arrives with a jolt; it unfolds gradually until its effects are visible everywhere. The question is whether governments and societies will confront these changes openly and work on adaptation, or allow them to accumulate quietly.
