Lyndon Faulkner’s appointment as chair of the Welsh Rugby Union has prompted a mixed reaction, with some hailing an astute appointment and others questioning anything the governing body does after years of disillusionment with Welsh rugby.
Those familiar with Faulkner’s business career have welcomed the move, while a section of supporters have long since turned their backs on the WRU, regarding anything associated with the organisation as a farce.
A formidable corporate record
There is little doubt that Faulkner brings an impressive CV to the role. He played pivotal roles in the introduction of CDs and DVDs, helped launch Xbox, Windows XP and Office 2000 during his time at Microsoft, and led Nimbus CD International’s flotation on Nasdaq. The acquisitions that followed helped build Technicolor into a global force in digital media and home entertainment.
His subsequent career at Pelican Products, where he was a leader from 2006 to 2021, was equally impressive. He drove the company’s international expansion into 26 countries, overseeing seven manufacturing facilities, award-winning innovation and achievements in international trade. He was also named Ernst & Young Entrepreneur of the Year twice, with his business expertise recognised by publications and institutions including Forbes, Fortune, The New York Times and Stanford University.
On paper, it is an outstanding record. But the WRU is hardly short of boardroom experience. Independent non-executive director Andrew Williams is the UK’s longest-serving FTSE 100 chief executive, while Jennifer Mathias is a former chief financial officer of Rathbones.
Faulkner’s corporate pedigree is formidable, but it is not without precedent among those already around the table. Nor did his predecessor, Richard Collier-Keywood, lack professional credentials. The challenge is that running a successful business and navigating professional sport are two very different propositions, particularly in Welsh rugby, where the problems extend far beyond the balance sheet.
Trust must come before reform
Faulkner arrives at an organisation facing a fractured relationship with its supporters, deep-rooted tensions between the governing body and the professional clubs, and a level of scrutiny that few corporate leaders encounter. His CV may have earned him the benefit of the doubt in some quarters, but winning over those who have lost faith in the WRU will require considerably more than a distinguished corporate record.
Collier-Keywood and chief executive Abi Tierney were criticised for being based in England, and Faulkner has been based in Los Angeles. He must demonstrate that he is prepared to spend significant time on the ground in Wales, engaging with clubs, supporters and the wider rugby community.
Faulkner’s first priority must be to establish trust and confidence, particularly with Wales’s four professional clubs. A lack of trust and persistent friction within the system have helped tear Welsh rugby apart in recent years, with disagreements over funding, governance and the future structure of the professional game creating an increasingly difficult environment in which to operate.
Radical change is undoubtedly needed, but the game’s principal stakeholders must believe that it is being undertaken for the greater good of Welsh rugby. That means listening to their concerns, taking those concerns seriously and demonstrating that their views can influence decisions. Consultation will count for little if the clubs and supporters believe the outcome has already been decided.
He takes the reins at one of the most consequential moments in the WRU’s history, with plans to reduce the number of professional teams from four to three already well advanced. Under the current proposals, either the Ospreys or Scarlets would have to go unless a merger between them provides an alternative.
It has also been made clear that the successful candidate would need to be aligned with the WRU’s strategic direction. Yet Faulkner’s record suggests he will bring his own ideas about how an organisation should be run. Although major decisions rest with the board, the chair should have considerable influence over its direction and the arguments that ultimately prevail.
Cutting costs is only part of the answer
Faulkner must also look beyond the professional clubs and challenge the WRU executive to reduce the governing body’s own cost base. It would be difficult to justify asking the regions to shoulder the consequences of restructuring without subjecting the organisation at the centre of the game to equally rigorous scrutiny.
This is where his commercial experience could prove valuable. Alongside identifying savings, he should examine how the WRU can generate additional revenue and make better use of its existing assets and commercial opportunities.
Reducing the number of professional teams cannot simply become an exercise in cutting costs. If fewer clubs are expected to secure the future of Welsh rugby, they must be able to see how the resulting savings will translate into greater investment, stronger squads and a properly funded player development pathway.
That pathway is central to the argument. Any new settlement must protect the pipeline of talent on which the national team depends, with meaningful investment in academies and player development rather than a short-term focus on reducing expenditure.
Faulkner has spoken of wanting to work with people. The test will be whether that philosophy translates into a genuine partnership with the professional clubs, particularly over the development of young Welsh players. There is a strong case for trusting the regions to manage their own academies and play a central role in developing talent, rather than allowing an increasingly centralised system under Dave Reddin to dictate every aspect of the pathway.
The WRU has a legitimate role in setting standards and protecting the interests of the national team, but that does not mean every decision must be made centrally. Collaboration should involve a clear division of responsibilities, with the clubs given the authority and resources to do their jobs and the WRU held accountable for the wider strategic direction.
An Anglo-Welsh league could change the debate
The number of professional teams in Wales should be informed by how many can realistically be sustained within an Anglo-Welsh league. The future structure of the game cannot sensibly be considered in isolation from the competition that Welsh clubs are expected to play in.
The United Rugby Championship has failed to capture the imagination of many Welsh supporters, and the competition has done little to restore the connection between the regions and their communities. The WRU should be making every effort to secure Welsh participation in an Anglo-Welsh competition, which could revive interest through renewed rivalries, familiar opposition and more meaningful fixtures.
This is not simply a question of nostalgia. A competition featuring Welsh and English clubs could offer a more compelling proposition for supporters and commercial partners, although its viability would depend on agreement over the format, finances, governance and the demands of the international calendar.
There would be significant obstacles to overcome. The WRU cannot make such a competition happen on its own, and the willingness of English clubs and their governing bodies is obviously crucial. Those difficulties should not prevent Faulkner from exploring every avenue to make it a reality.
There is a window of opportunity here. English clubs are seeking ways to strengthen their fixture offerings and generate additional revenue, while Welsh teams could bring established teams, rivalries and a substantial rugby audience to the table.
For too long, the debate in Wales has centred on how many teams the country can afford to keep, rather than what kind of competition would give those teams the best chance of succeeding. Faulkner should be asking what the future of Welsh rugby might look like within an Anglo-Welsh structure before deciding whether three teams, or even two, is the right model.
If an Anglo-Welsh league offered a sustainable commercial future, the number of Welsh participants should be determined by what the competition could support and what was required to maintain a credible pathway for homegrown talent. The WRU should not allow an immediate drive to cut costs to dictate decisions that could shape Welsh rugby for a generation.
Ultimately, an Anglo-Welsh league would not be a panacea for Welsh rugby’s many ills. It would not automatically resolve the WRU’s financial pressures, repair relationships with the clubs or restore supporters’ faith in the governing body. Those challenges would remain, regardless of the competition in which the regions played.
But Welsh rugby needs a compelling future as well as a sustainable financial structure. Faulkner must rebuild trust, challenge the executive to operate more efficiently, generate new revenue and ensure that any reduction in professional teams leads to greater investment in the players and pathways on which the national team depends. Above all, he must be prepared to look beyond the existing model and explore alternatives that could give the professional game a fresh sense of purpose.
Cutting teams may address some of the immediate financial pressures, but it will not, on its own, reconnect Welsh rugby with its supporters. If Faulkner is serious about restoring confidence and securing the future of the men’s game, pursuing an Anglo-Welsh league should be a central part of his thinking.
