Anton Jäger: Why Hyperpolitics Explains Our Chaotic Era
Anton Jäger: Hyperpolitics and Our Chaotic Era

Anton Jäger, a 32-year-old academic and author of Hyperpolitics: Extreme Politicization without Political Consequences, has been lauded for his ability to make sense of current political turmoil. The book, described by the New York Times as “among the best and most dazzling efforts to model the political present in all its maddening strangeness,” is being read by Labour watchers and leftwing thinkers.

Jäger, raised in Brussels and educated at the University of Essex and Cambridge, now lectures in the history of political thought at University College, Oxford. Asked to situate himself politically, he says: “Even with all the baggage and connotations, I still think the easiest thing is to call myself a Marxist.”

The Four Eras of Political Engagement

Jäger outlines four periods: mass politics (1914–1989), post-politics (1989–2008), anti-politics (2008–2020), and hyperpolitics (2020 onward). Mass politics featured high politicisation and institutionalisation—people joined parties, unions, and clubs. Post-politics saw low institutionalisation and politicisation, with technocrats running affairs. Anti-politics brought a resurgence of protest movements with institutional ambitions, like Podemos and Syriza.

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Hyperpolitics, Jäger writes, is “intense politicisation, with neither institutional roots nor ambitions.” He compares Black Lives Matter protests to the Capitol riot: “Morally, they are worlds apart … Organisationally, however, these movements exhibit a striking set of similarities: fleeting in duration, they maintain no membership rolls and struggle to impose any real discipline on their adherents.” The result: “everything explodes and nothing changes.”

Institutional Decline and the Right

Jäger attributes the destruction of political organisations to union busting by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, alongside cultural shifts. He notes that Thatcher also “did a controlled demolition of popular Conservatism,” replacing it with PR and private funding. Today, the right, like Reform UK, is “heavily leader-dependent” with no party infrastructure, just “Nigel and a smartphone and then a couple of private donors.”

However, he acknowledges that private funding, such as Elon Musk’s wealth, gives the right an advantage. “The fact that we can even talk of a trillionaire … means there’s a complete secession of that individual from what we could even call society.”

Not Fascism, but Bonapartism

Jäger argues that Trump’s US is not fascist, because fascism arises only when the left poses a direct threat. “The left is doing itself too many favours by considering its opponents fascists,” he says. “You’re overestimating your strength.” Instead, he sees Bonapartism, where a leader relies on passive support from an unorganised base, like Marx’s “potatoes in a sack.”

On the possibility of rebuilding institutions, Jäger is cautious: “We do live in a society in which the incentives for leaving rather than entering organisations are much higher.” Yet he adds: “Repoliticisation is good. Hyperpolitics has increased people’s consciousness of the fact that politics matters.”

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