A probe claims Russia is smuggling war tech materials into the country under the guise of sex toys to bypass sanctions on imports. A Chinese firm that advertises "smart sex toys" is allegedly sending packages including industrial electronics that could help Putin's war effort.
Dual-use components found in customs records
Dual-use components such as motors, circuits and even drones have reportedly been found in customs records shipped to Russia by Shenzhen NuanQin Technology, which promotes itself online as a provider of premium sex toys and lingerie.
Under international sanctions, cutting-edge technology and "dual-use" items like drones, semiconductors, thermal cameras and electronic parts that could be used on the battlefield are banned from entering Russia.
Researchers identify multiple firms bypassing sanctions
Researchers at the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) found thousands of such items are bypassing sanctions by being sent from unlikely distributors, it is claimed.
Others allegedly include Fuxin Pharmaceutical, which makes medicines and agrochemicals, but trades in Western microelectronics. And Taibung Piping Equipment sells steel fittings for energy and petrochemical systems, alongside integrated circuits, semiconductors, and power electronics to Russia, it is claimed. Many others have generic names, no websites, and almost no public footprint.
Call for shared lists of sanction-bypassing companies
Senior researcher Viktoriia Vyshnivska said: "To a Western dual-use manufacturer, they may look like small retailers or freight forwarders — unremarkable enough to pass conventional sanctions screening and keep trading."
Viktoriia called for countries to share lists of companies bypassing sanctions to help governments and manufacturers scrutinise firms better and stop "clean" suppliers getting an automatic green light to trade with Russia.
She wrote in the EUObserver: "Their addresses can reveal what company-by-company screening misses. Sharing one with a sanctioned firm does not warrant automatic designation, but it is a strong signal of diversion risk. The numbers speak for themselves.
"One Hong Kong office unit housed at least 45 companies, with perhaps 20 more: 14 under sanctions or export controls, and 31 unrestricted. Together, they supplied Russia with over $16m in priority microelectronics—within our dataset alone."
"Other obscure suppliers lead businesses to claim they sell hats, salon equipment, or even offer immigration services."
Such links may be unsurprising in a world of virtual offices and corporate service providers, but a simple sanctions check misses them, even as tens of millions of dollars in trade pass through.
Scale of the trade and its impact
NAKO identified at least 14 companies supplying microelectronics to Russia from those same offices. Only five have been sanctioned. A study of roughly 1,800 foreign suppliers involved in more than $800 million worth of trade in priority Western microelectronics.
Viktoriia added: "Every company in our dataset, sanctioned or not, supplied Russia with priority microelectronics. We found more than 200 addresses linked to restricted entities. Over 450 suppliers used them, accounting for nearly $380m in trade.
"It takes years to sanction something that can be replicated in days—so what is the point of sanctions at all?"
