Trump's Greenland obsession: strategic sense or diplomatic folly?
Trump's Greenland obsession: strategic sense or diplomatic folly?

Donald Trump's fixation on Greenland, which has puzzled and angered many in Europe, may contain a kernel of strategic truth, even if his methods are flawed. Since his first term, Trump has repeatedly floated the idea of acquiring the island from Denmark, and after re-election, he ramped up rhetoric about taking it "one way or another," threatening the Nato alliance and post-war security foundations.

In September, the US and Denmark signed an agreement allowing more US troops on the island, without the takeover Trump often jokes about. "The United States will FOREVER have the complete ability to do what is necessary in Greenland," Trump wrote on social media. "We will work with the people of Greenland in its development and construction."

Strategic importance and geopolitical rivalry

Greenland has played a crucial role in North American security since the cold war, with airfields near the eastern seaboard, vast mineral resources, and a location ideal for tracking Arctic weather. More recently, it has become a pawn in the US-China geopolitical struggle. Jeff Landry, the US special envoy to Greenland, wrote in early 2026 that greater American presence would "facilitate deployment of advanced missile defense systems" and "crowd out hostile Chinese and Russian influence."

The region is becoming a geostrategic hotspot. Russia is increasing energy transit there to avoid global choke points, and China declared itself a "near-Arctic state" in 2018. Both countries have conducted security and military drills near US territorial waters in Alaska, putting America's biggest adversaries in its back yard.

Climate change and economic interests

Climate change has opened the Arctic to resource extraction and new sea routes. The Arctic seabed holds gas, oil, and rare-earth minerals, most yet to be mined or claimed. In August, Chinese shipping company Sea Legend started a weekly trans-polar commercial route through Russian waters, claiming it will halve the usual 40-day journey between Europe and Asia, attractive given the Houthi threat in the Red Sea.

The US, with limited icebreaker capacity, has begun trying to build them jointly with Finland, a project endorsed by both Joe Biden and Trump. However, the lack of icebreakers is part of a larger problem. In 1975, the US shipbuilding industry was ranked No 1 globally, with more than 70 commercial ships on order. Today, the US produces less than 1% of the world's commercial vessels, while China tripled its production relative to the US over the past two decades, producing more than 1,000 ocean-going vessels last year versus the US's 10. More than 90% of military equipment, supplies, and fuel travels by sea.

Industrial policy and alliances

This asymmetry comes with commercial and military concerns, set against the backdrop of the end of the neoliberal era. In the US, both Republicans and Democrats are pushing industrial policy to restore industries like shipbuilding and chip-making. The EU is also grappling with cheap Chinese electric cars, steel, lithium batteries, and solar panels moving from US markets to Europe.

Trump's focus on Greenland may not be as misplaced as it seems, but there's a glaring flaw in his approach. In a world of new spheres of influence, the US needs friends, and so does Europe. Shared supply chains, security agreements, and trade pathways can be used to mutual advantage, but it will take careful statecraft that this administration isn't known for. Trump's instinct knows the Arctic is important, but he doesn't seem to understand how to secure the US's hemispheric back yard without destroying existing alliances. The US's future will depend on the next administration doing better.